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Given the unique diversity of Russian regions, regional studies are becoming particularly 
important for ensuring the stability and development of Russia. There is an extensive 
body of literature on the economic and social characteristics of Russian regions, their 
types and ranking whereas the study of collective consciousness requires further atten-
tion. It is the collective consciousness that shapes human activity, the results of which 
largely determine the development of countries and their regions. The authors study the 
spiritual sphere of regions, the inner world of people, who are human capital. This study 
is particularly important in relation to Russian youth, who have become one of the most 
active social groups. The public demand for the analysis of collective consciousness has 
been constantly growing. The authors argue that there are regional differences in collec-
tive consciousness, which are manifested most prominently in the comparison of east-
ern and western regions. The growing intensity of interaction between Europe and Asia 
makes the comparison of the western and eastern border regions of Russia particularly 
important from the geopolitical point of view. The authors employ the principles of an 
emerging scientific direction, border regional studies, for a comparative analysis of the 
collective consciousness of students from two border regions located on the Russia-Euro-
pean Union and Russia-China borders. The authors present the results of the survey they 
conducted in the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad) and Amur State 
University (Blagoveshchensk). They examine the sociological phenomenon of ‘regional 
consciousness’ and substantiate the criteria for selecting the objects of research. It is the 
first time in sociology that logistic regression models reflecting the main characteristics 
of regional consciousness have been built. The article aims to confirm the multiplicity 
of types of regional consciousness and to demonstrate that in the socially homogeneous 
group, Russian graduate students, there are still regional differences even in the generally 
similar assessments of the ongoing social processes.
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Regional consciousness
In Russian public discourse, the belief that we, the country’s nationals, do not 
know our homeland well has become commonplace [1; 2]. This statement, which, 
among other things, gives Russian social scientists some criticism, is not entirely 
new. Naturally, there is an objective reason for it — Russia’s constituent regions 
are extremely diverse in geographical, economic, social, demographic, historical, 
cultural, ethnic, confessional, political, administrative, legal, and environmental 
terms. Uneven post-Soviet development has made these differences even more 
visible. This holds true especially for regional disparities in economic prosperity. 
According to the World Bank, Russia has the highest level of regional inequality 
among large developing countries. This recent research area owes its immense 
popularity to societal concerns about sustainability and national socio-economic 
development.
Russia’s regional diversity is reflected in the mass consciousness of regional 
populations, which, in its turn, affects all areas of social life, including the one 
that is taking a new urgency today, i. e. environmental management. Studying 
individual, group, and public consciousness is important both theoretically and 
practically since human actions are a product of thoughts and feelings. This may 
well apply to regional consciousness. It is a form of perception of group cohesion 
rooted in the feeling of territorial integrity. The territorial integrity component 
gives regional consciousness a political slant.
An integrated part of its country, the region constitutes an independent area 
of knowledge, and regional consciousness, which is part of national public con-
sciousness, constitutes one too.
One of the basic concepts formulated by founders of the sociology of con-
sciousness is as follows: the condition of mass consciousness can be described as 
one of the forms only at a very concrete level and in view of distinctive character-
istics of the agent of mass consciousness [3—5]. The Russian theoretician of the 
sociology of mass consciousness, Boris Grushin, introduced in his authoritative 
work Mass Consciousness: an attempt at a definition and problems of research 
the concept of plurality of mass consciousness among different parts of society. 
He also highlighted the need to study individual carriers of mass consciousness 
[6]. Later on, individuals have been the focus of both Russian [7—10] and in-
ternational [10—12] research into mass consciousness. The more concrete the 
object, the more operational the study is.
Historically rooted regional consciousness is one of the most stable forms 
of the practical existence of collective consciousness. Regional consciousness 
embodies collective consciousness in its very concrete state — that in which it 
reflects day-to-day life, the most permanent part of human experience associated 
with a special form of encountering and perceiving a given environment. In this 
sense, regional consciousness is closely linked to territorial identity, the meaning 
of which, as practice shows, has been increasing. Regional context affects the 
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consciousness of people living in a certain region. This circumstance takes on 
special significance in the process of regionalisation, which goes hand in hand 
with globalisation.
An important global process is the growing intensity of inter-civilisational, 
cross-cultural, and intergovernmental cooperation. It gives an ever more pivotal 
role to border regions, in which these collaborations take place. This holds es-
pecially for Russia, which has the longest national border in the world and is in 
contact with a vast number of civilisations, cultures, and states. Out of 85 Russian 
regions, 46 are border territories. Alongside general regional differences, there 
are border-specific characteristics. The border region is a remote periphery, an 
area with poorly developed industrial production, usually as a result of reluctance 
to erect large manufacturing facilities near borders. All this explains why Russian 
borderlands are so sparsely populated and why their economic development op-
tions are so few.
A principal characteristic of border regions is their ambivalent status. On the 
one hand, they are part of the distant provinces. On the other, they are politically 
visible centres and junctions where two neighbouring countries, two neighbour-
ing societies, interact to create a third, intermediate border society, which is the 
focus of a new area of regional studies — border region studies. To explore re-
gional consciousness of border area populations, we employed the concept of 
social mesosystems, which we proposed [13, p. 22—23] and successfully tested 
[14] in our earlier works.
Not only is the border an international legal institution that facilitates co-
operation between neighbouring countries and ensures the inviolability of ter-
ritorial integrity, but it is an object of activities undertaken by people living in 
the border districts that perform the mentioned functions. In the consciousness 
of the border district population, the border appears as an important symbolic 
sign of national affiliation [15]. The idiosyncrasy of the borderland mindset has 
been described in the literature. For example, as early as the beginning of the 
20th century, Goerg Simmel cogently noted: ‘ [t] he boundary is not a spatial 
fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself 
spatially’ [16, p. 143].
Studies into the mass consciousness and day-to-day behaviour of people liv-
ing in border areas reveal how the space of cross-cultural dialogue emerges, how 
its elements function, what rules determine the behaviour strategies of the local 
population, what role the border has in these processes, and how border regions 
differ in these parameters.
An attempt to explore the above was made in mid-2018. At the time, we car-
ried out a comparative analysis of the mass consciousness of final-year university 
students from the Russian–EU and Russian–Chinese borderlands. Students were 
selected as the most digitally skilled and spatially dynamic homogenous social 
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group that is active across all the spheres of social life because all social process-
es, either directly or indirectly, affect their life, social standing, and image of the 
future. In their turn, society and authorities increasingly view young people as the 
most promising age group that has the greatest innovation potential and can solve 
the problems of Russia’s socio-economic development [17; 18].
Over the last decade, young people across Russia have become more politi-
cally active. This fact lends further urgency to studying this age group: the psy-
chology of the new, post-Soviet Russian generation is attracting interest from 
the general public. Unlike older generations, this highly mobile social group has 
accesses to vast information. It is open to discovering new cultures. It is less geo-
graphically dependent and thus less susceptible to the ‘native soil’ ideology. All 
the above makes a comparative analysis of the mass consciousness of the western 
and eastern borderlands more objective and ‘chemically purer’. The theoretical 
and methodological vision should be supplemented by practical considerations: 
the social groups in question, the graduates of Russian universities, will soon 
have to solve the problems of the borderlands.
With this in mind, the following hypothesis was formulated. The socio-politi-
cal consciousness of young people living in the western and eastern borderlands 
is largely shaped by the major forms of mass consciousness: economic, legal, 
historical, civilisational/cultural, and existential. To test the hypothesis, five fac-
tors were selected:
1) the economic factor: the financial situation of the respondent;
2) the legal factor, which, through the knowledge of laws, forms an idea about 
the functions of the state, helps to sort out priorities (a strong state vs high stan-
dards of living), and indicates the level of respondents’ legal consciousness and 
their political orientation (liberal or statist);
3) the historical factor: the perception of the past and the vision of the future;
4) the civilisational/cultural factor, which shows how the civilisational identi-
ty of respondents affects their beliefs and opinions;
5) the existential factor, which deals with the ideas of security and viability of 
the country.
The criteria used to select objects for comparison
The criteria for border region selection allowed for Russia’s bi-continental 
geography and its geostrategic position between two of the world’s three larg-
est economies — the EU (22.6% of the global GDP) and China (16.5% of the 
global GDP). The Russian–EU (western) borderlands comprise five territories — 
the Murmansk, Leningrad, Pskov, and Kaliningrad regions and the Republic of 
Karelia. The Russian–Chinese (eastern) borderlands also include five regions: 
Zabaikalsky, Khabarovsk, Primorsky, Amursky, and the Jewish autonomous re-
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gion. We chose for analysis the regional centres that best represented the west 
and the east. Key representativeness criteria were the involvement of the region 
in the economic and sociocultural collaborations with the neighbouring state and 
the proximity of the regional capital to the state border.
The Kaliningrad region has an edge over other western regions: it is situated 
within the EU. The Amursky region has the longest, 1250 km-long, border with 
China, which runs along the River Amur. Russian–Chinese collaborations are 
thriving throughout the length of the border. Out of 19 districts in the region, the 
most densely populated ones are located along the Amur.
Sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, the Kaliningrad enclave is the 
epitome of Russia’s western borderlands. The sociocultural diffusion between 
Russia and the EU is at its highest there. Many joint ventures have been ar-
ranged in the region with Lithuanian and Polish businesses. The EU accounts 
for 65—70% of the territory’s international trade. There is yet another import-
ant factor — the region’s small area (15 000 km2, a third of that of the Moscow 
region). Its capital is 37 km away from the Polish border. This proximity gives 
one a ‘feeling of the border’. Kaliningraders often visit Lithuania and even 
more often Poland. To get to mainland Russia, the region’s residents have to 
travel through two other countries — Lithuania and Belarus.
The Amursky region is, in its turn, the epitome of the eastern borderlands in 
terms of its location, past, and traditions of the neighbourhood. This holds espe-
cially for the region’s capital — Blagoveshchensk. The city is a site of intense 
economic, recreational, and personal contacts between Russians and the Chinese. 
The river, which separates Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese city of Heihe is 
520m wide. In effect, these two cities form an agglomeration held together by 
numerous connections — administrative, educational, cultural, and commercial 
ties and information transfer.
The Russian–Chinese borderlands have no other city that could match Bla-
goveshchensk in the scope and intensity of inter-civilisational cooperation. Both 
the Kaliningrad and Amursky regions are perfect examples of the sociocultural 
phenomenon of borderlands, whereas the residents of their capital cities suffi-
ciently represent the urban population of the Russian–EU and the Russian–Chi-
nese borderlands.
Regional consciousness of young people:  
differences between the west and the east
To conduct a comparative analysis of mass and group consciousness in the 
two borderlands, 200 final-year students of Kaliningrad and Blagoveshchensk 
universities were surveyed in mid-2018. The sample, which is represented by the 
students’ faculties and specialisations, was calculated by the staff of sociology 
departments who carried out the survey.
Overall, differences in regional consciousness in the west and the east were 
clearly visible.
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Although the Amursky region ranks lower than the Kaliningrad region on 
standards of living (52nd and 37th respectively, as of 2018), 40% of Blagovesh-
chensk residents and 29% of Kaliningraders see their financial situation as good. 
This is largely explained by the fact that when assessing their situation, the for-
mer compared themselves with the Chinese, and the latter, with more affluent 
Lithuanians and Poles.
There were significant differences in views on the cultural and civilisational 
place of Russia. In the east, 22% of respondents believe that Russia constitutes 
a special civilisation rather than belongs to the European one; in the west, this 
opinion is shared by 32%. This difference suggests that Kaliningraders have a 
better idea of the European civilisation.
The borderlands differ dramatically in the perception of external and internal 
threats to the country. In the east, 52% of respondents report fear of external 
threats, and 26%, of internal ones (as compared to 31 and 54% in the west). The 
neighbours of Kaliningrad are smaller states, whereas Blagoveshchensk borders 
on a large, ambitious, and rapidly developing country with a population and GDP 
that are ten times those of Russia.
The percentage of those who believe in the great future of their country is 
slightly higher in the east than it is in the west (32.5% and 29% respectively). 
There are, however, fewer pessimists in the east: only 11.5% believe that a great 
Russia is a thing of the past. In the west, 21% share this point of view. Remote-
ness from the centre of globalisation events makes the residents of Blagovesh-
chensk more optimistic about the future.
Although eastern and western respondents differed on most points, they 
had some similar attitudes and beliefs. There were no statistical differenc-
es in answers to legal-factor questions. In the west, 16% of respondents 
believed that national laws should make the state stronger; 78%, that they 
should work towards higher standards of living (as compared to 14.5% and 
74.5% in the east).
Respondents had very similar opinions of the current socio-political pro-
cesses. In the west, 38% strongly or somewhat agreed that the country was 
heading in the right direction; in the east, 36%. The percentage of those who 
strongly or somewhat disagreed was also almost the same: 53% in the west and 
51% in the east.
Table 1 summarises statistics on the political (qpolit), econоmic (qecon), legal 
(qleg), cultural/civilisational (qciv), historical (qhist), and existential (qexist) forms of 
consciousness.
The number of respondents who gave no answer ranged from 6% to 56% de-
pending on the question. The only question that was not answered by more than 
half of respondents in both the east and the west was qhist. Overall, there were 
more undecided respondents in the east regardless of the question.
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Table 1
Survey result statistics, %
Question Answer West East
Our country is heading in 
the right direction (qpolit)
Strongly/somewhat agree (1) 38 36
Strongly/somewhat disagree (2) 53 51
No answer(3) 9 13
What is the financial posi-
tion of your family? (qecon)
Above average (1) 29 40
Average or below average (2) 71 60
What should national laws 
be aimed at? (qleg)
Creating a strong state (1) 16 14.5
Ensuring high standards of living (2) 78 74.5
No answer (3) 6 11
Are the Russians part of the 
European civilisation (qciv)
Yes, they are (1) 54 49.5
No, they are not (2) 32 22
No answer(3) 14 28.5
What is the historical desti-
ny of Russia? (qhist)
Russia has a great future (1) 29 32.5
A great Russia is a thing of the past (2) 21 11.5
No answer(3) 50 56
What is more dangerous for 
Russia? (qexist)
External threats (1) 31 52
Internal threats (2) 54 26
No answer (3) 15 22
 
Table 2 contains a statistical analysis of the difference in answers given in the 
west and the east.
Table 2
Statistical analysis of the difference (d) in answers given  
by respondents in the west and the east
Question Difference, dsample 95% confidence interval Significance
qpolit 1 0.020 (0.059) – 0.10 <dpolit 1 <0.14 —
qpolit 2 0.020 (0.061) – 0.10 <dpolit 2 <0.14 —
qecon 1 – 0.110 (0.057) – 0.22 <decon 1 <0.00 *
qleg 1 0.015 (0.045) – 0.07 <dleg 1 <0.10 —
qleg 2 0.035 (0.052) – 0.07 <dleg 2 <0.14 —
qciv 1 0.045 (0.120) – 0.08 <dcult 1 <0.17 —
qciv 2 0.100 (0.055) – 0.01 <dcult 2 <0.21 *
qhist 1 – 0.035 (0.111) – 0.15 <dhist 1 <0.08 —
qhist 2 0.095 (0.047) 0.00 <dhist. 2 <0.19 **
qexist 1 – 0.210 (0.058) – 0.32 <dexist 1 <– 0.10 ***
qexist 2 0.280 (0.059) 0.16 <dexist 2 <0.40 ***
Comment 1: *, **, *** —10 %, 5 %, and 1 % are respective levels of significance.
Comment 2. The table does not contain results for the second answer (qecon, 2, ‘our finan-
cial position is average or below average’) since they are the plane reflection of those for 
the first answer: decon, 2 = - decon, 1. Results for the ‘no answer’ option have also been omitted.
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The greatest difference (significance level of 1%) between the east and the 
west was the perception of external and internal threats (qexist). The question about 
the destiny of Russia (qhist) was also answered differently in the two regions. Al-
though almost the same number of respondents believed that Russia had a great 
future, the difference in the number of answers ‘a great Russia is a thing of the 
past’ had a 5% significance level.
Figure 1 shows the results from Table 2 as a diagram.
Figure 1. 95% confidence intervals for d
Comment: midpoints of confidence intervals correspond to differences in answers 
given in the west and the east.
Modelling east-west differences in regional consciousness
To test the hypothesis formulated at the end of the first section of this article, 
we selected five factors that affected the socio-political consciousness of Rus-
sian young people (qpolit): economic (qecon), legal (qleg), cultural/civilisational (qciv), 
historical (qhist), and existential (qexist) [19]. Each factor, except qecon, had three 
answers (see Table 1), including the ‘no answer’ option. As mentioned above, the 
distribution of answers by questions was not the same in the west and the east. 
Since the effect of differences in answers on the dependent variable (qpolit) was 
statistically insignificant, it was reasonable to assume that the effect of the factors 
was not the same in the two regions. To test whether that was true, two polyno-
mial logistic regression models were constructed: one for the west and the other 
for the east. The results were unsatisfactory. In each regression, only the factor 
qhist was significant
1. That did not come as a surprise since the uncertainty [20] 
contained in the ‘no answer’ option was modelled too.
Four logistic regression models with binary regressions were produced: two 
for the west and two for the east. All calculations were performed using the SPSS 
Statistics 24 software and Microsoft Excel.
1 If the level of significance is not specified, it is 95%.
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Logistical regression models (logit models) are widely used in sociology, par-
ticularly, in the statistical analysis of survey result (repressors) [21]. Sociologists 
prefer logit- to probit models for simple result interpretation [22]. A logistic re-
gression models the probability p of the event y, which takes the value 0 or 1 
depending on the series of accompanying factors (repressors)  . The 
basic assumption2 of the logit model is
2 Another model assumption: the observations are mutually dependent.
��� � �|��� ��� � � ��� � �������  �
�
��������������������, (1) 
where X = (1, x1,..., xk), B = (b0, b1,..., bk) is the vector of required parameters; the 
scale product of the vectors is enclosed in the angle brackets  . 
Formula (1) is usually written as 
logit��� � l� ���� � �� � ���� � �� ����, (2) 
where p = ��� � �|��� ���� � ���. It is assumed that there are no ��� ��� � � �� such 
that p = 0 or p = 1. 
The interpretation of logit model coefficients differs from that characteristic of 
analysis of simple linear regressions. For the factor xi, the factor bi, i = 1..., k is 
interpreted as a change in the function logit(p) when xi is incremented by 1; the 
value of the coefficient b0 equals that of logit(p) when the regressors are ‘turned 
off’, i.e. �� � �� � � � �� � �� 
The likelihood function corresponding to the events y1..., yN is 
���� ��� ���� � ��� � ∏ � ������� �������� �� �
�
������ �������, (3) 
where Xi is the vector of the regressors, which correlates to the observed object i. 
The vector �� � ����� ���� � � ���), which maximises the rhs of formula (3) is taken to 
be the maximum likelihood estimation of the vector of parameters B.  
Each of the factors qleg, qciv, qhist, qexist is represented by two binary regressors. 
For the factor qhist, these are the regressors qhist 1 (1 — Russia has a great future, 0 — 
a different answer) and qhist,2 (1 — a great Russia is a thing of the past, 0 — a 
different answer). These regressors are not additional, i.e. qhist, 2  1 – qhist, 1. The 
same holds for three more factors (see Table 1). The factor qecon has one regressor, 
qecon, 2 (‘our financial position is average or below average’). 
Two logit models were constructed, one for the west and the other for the east, 
for the dependent binary variable qpolit,1. Two more logit models were produced for 
the binary variable qpolit, 2. 
Models were chosen by exclusion. The initial regression contained all nine 
regressors. The likelihood-ratio test was used as the model selection criterion. 



















— — — 
0.73** 
(0.34) 
0.08 < b < 
1.37 
qleg, 1 1.97** 0.86* (0.47) — — 
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Table 3
Model parameter evaluation
Factor Model I (agree, the west)








qecon, 2 — — — 0.73** (0.34)0.08 < b < 1.37
qleg, 1 1.97** (0.78)
0.44 < b < 3.51
0.86* (0.47)
– 0.07 <b < 
1.79
— —
qleg, 2 — — 1.63** (0.73)0.20 < b < 3.06 —
qciv, 1 1.39** (0.56)
0.28 < b < 2.50 — —
0.62* (0.34)
– 0.01 <b <1.26
qciv, 2 — — 1.42** (0.63)0.19 < b < 2.65 —
qhist,1 2.24*** (0.58)
1.09 < b < 3.39
1.84*** (0.35)
1.16 < b < 2.53
– 2.39*** (0.66)
– 3.68 <b 
<– 1.09
– 1.58*** (0.34)
– 2.27 <b 
<– 0.89




– 0.13 <b <1.87
1.08*** (0.34)
0.33 < b < 1.82
Сonstant – 2.31 – 1.92 – 1.46 – 0.46
% of accurate-
ly predicted 1 
values 
55.3 48.6 90.6 78.4
Total % of 
accurate pre-
dictions 
79.0 76.9 78 68.3
Number of ob-
servations, N 200 200 200 200
In each regressor section in Table 3, the first line contains the coefficient es-
timate for that regressor, whereas the standard deviation of the estimate is given 
in round brackets.3 The second line shows the 95% confidence interval for the 
coefficient. The table demonstrates coefficient estimates for only those regressors 
that were included in the final models. The regressor qhist, 2 was not included in 
any of the models, nor is it shown in the table. To classify observations, the cutoff 
point of 0.5 was chosen. For the first two models, the percentage of accurately 
predicted 1 values was low, whereas that of accurately predicted 0 values was 
rather high. For more balanced predictions, ROC curves can be used to select the 
cutoff point [23, pp. 228—230].
Each pair of models reveals both differences and similarities between the two 
regions. 
3 Or its asymptotic estimate, to be exact (see [23, pp. 193—194]).
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For the first pair (I and II) significant answers were ‘National laws should be 
aimed primarily at making the state stronger’ (5% and 10% levels respectively) 
and ‘Russia has a great future (1% for both regions). The answer ‘Russians are 
part of the European civilisation’ was significant only in the west; ‘The most dan-
gerous threats to our country are external’, only in the east (1% level). 
For the second pair (III and IV), a significant answer was ‘Russia has a great 
future’ (a 1% level for both regions).4 The answer ‘The most dangerous threats to 
our country are internal’ was significant at a 10% level in the west and a 1% level 
in the east. The answer ‘Laws should work towards higher standards of living’ 
was significant only in the west; ‘The financial position of my family is average 
or below average’, only in the east.5 As to the question whether Russia is part of 
the European civilisation, different answers were significant: ‘The Russians are 
not part of the European civilisation’ in the west and ‘The Russians are part of the 
European civilisation’ in the east (10% level). This difference is easily explained: 
living in the westernmost region of Russia, Kaliningraders have a realistic idea of 
the European civilisation, whereas, for residents of Blagoveshchensk, Europe is 
mostly vicarious experience.
The only answer that was significant in all models (at a 1% level) was given 
to the question about the historical destiny of Russia.
Finally, two integrated models were constructed to cover all 400 observa-
tions from the west and the east for both dependent variables – qpolit, 1 and qpolit, 2. 
Alongside the ten initial regressors (including the constant), the model included 
ten more regressors, which were obtained by multiplying each regressor by the 
dummy variable qeast (1 — the respondent is from the east, 0 — the respondent is 
from the west). When the regional specificity of answers was taken into account, 
the models corroborated the significance and signs of all regressors obtained for 
individual models. For same-sign regressors common for the west and the east, 
significant differences among coefficients were not confirmed.
Conclusion
Our comparative analysis of regional consciousness of students in Russia’s 
western and eastern border regions, which was conducted for the first time in 
Russian social science, reveals significant regional differences even in function-
ally homogenous border territories and in the most homogenous social group. In 
most cases, these differences are accounted for by the geographical factor. The 
4 Remarkably, that was the only answer that had the negative sign before regressors. This 
means that, overall, the group tended to disagree with the statement that ‘Russia has a great 
future’ rather than to agree with that ‘a great Russia is a thing of the past’.
5 Model IV was the only one, for which the factor qecon was significant.
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percentage of the undecided was different too: the percentage of those who chose 
the ‘no answer’ option was much higher in the east than it was in the west. Many 
social phenomena have already been digested in the west, whereas the east is 
still trying to grasp them. Despite pronounced regional differences, there is an 
important similarity in the state of the socio-political consciousness of students. 
Even in this case, regional idiosyncrasies have their say: similar opinions about 
the way Russia is developing today are products of different combinations of 
many region-specific factors.
The four models of logistic regression proved the hypothesis that the so-
cio-political consciousness of students in two Russian borderlands was strongly 
affected by the basic forms of mass consciousness: economic, legal, historical, 
cultural/civilisational, and existential. Each regressor was significant at a 5% lev-
el in at least one model. The models have a high predictive capacity. The first 
three models had a total percentage of accurately predicted observations of above 
75%; the fourth model, of 69.3%. Mathematical modelling is, therefore, effective 
in studying regional consciousness.
Our data analysis uncovered the effect of mass consciousness asymmetry, 
which means that some factors change differently in the west and the east as 
long as alternative questions are concerned. For example, the answer ‘Russia 
has a great future’ did not reveal significant differences between the west and the 
east, whereas the difference in the number of those who answered that ‘A great 
Russia was a thing of the past’ was statistically significant. This effect is rooted 
in the uncertainty the respondents are facing. The effect of asymmetry was co the 
Jewish autonomyrroborated by the model analysis. For example, the factor qecon 
was insignificant both for the west or the east in the first pair of models. Yet, it 
was significant in the east and insignificant in the west when respondents were 
answering the alternative question ‘Do you agree or disagree that our country is 
heading in the right direction’.
The models proved experimentally the initial hypothesis of this research: re-
gional differences continue to have effect even when opinions and ideas about the 
current socio-political processes are rather similar. 
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